Comparison of Lightning Activity and Radar-Retrieved Microphysical Properties in EULINOX Storms

A combined analysis of microphysical thunderstorm properties derived by C-band polarimetric Doppler radar measurements and lightning observations from two ground-based systems are presented. Three types of storms, a multicell, a supercell, and a squall line, that were observed during the European Lightning Nitrogen Oxides project (EULINOX) are investigated. Correlations are sought between the mass of rain, graupel, hail, and snow derived form radar observations at different height levels and the electrical activity, represented either by cloud-to-ground or intracloud flashes. These relationships are explained by connecting the radar-derived properties with the non-inductive charging process. For the multicell and the supercell storm, the lightning activity can be linearly correlated to both the hydrometeor total mass and class specific mass in the upper part of the storm. It is shown that the fractions of graupel and hail above the −20 °C-level in these storms positively correlate with the intracloud flash activity in the supercell, and negatively for the cloud-to-ground lightning frequency in the multicell. No such relation can be established for the squall line, indicating that the convective organization plays a crucial role in the lightning development. The analysis of the masses in the different storms shows that lightning activity cannot be parameterized by total mass alone, other parameters have to be identified. The results provide important information for all lightning studies that rely on bulk properties of thunderstorms, e.g., the parameterization of lightning in mesoscale models or the nowcasting of lightning by radar

Inequality, Fairness and Social Capital

We study the impact of unjust inequality on social trust and trustworthiness, and its separate effect on the economically successful and the unsuccessful, in a controlled economic experiment. We find evidence for a negative effect of unfair economic inequality on social interactions. Probing the boundaries of this effect, we document that this erosion of social capital critically depends on the context: if a well-off person is not directly responsible for the outcome of the worse-off person, then we observe no negative effects on trust and trustworthiness in the aggregate. Moreover, our data do not support the view that higher status or wealth leads to an erosion of pro-social attitudes: the successful are always more generous; groups of unsuccessful persons are least efficient and least generous in the trust game

High-resolution EPMA X-ray images of mother liquid inclusions in a Pd2Ga single crystal

During crystal growth from solution inclusions of different compositions were trapped at the rim of a Pd2Ga single crystal. Their fine-grained (< 5 mu m) internal structure demands special requirements for electron microprobe analysis, realized by low-voltage (5 keV) element mapping applying a step size of 0.138 mu m for each pixel. It can be shown, that these inclusions represent an isolated chemical system, and that crystallisation upon cooling follows the expected thermodynamic phase relations. Thus the final composition in the centre of the inclusion consists of a small-scale mixture of PdGa and Pd5Ga3 evolved out of a solid-solid decomposition of Pd5Ga4

Neural signatures of strategic types in a two-person bargaining game

The management and manipulation of our own social image in the minds of others requires difficult and poorly understood computations. One computation useful in social image management is strategic deception: our ability and willingness to manipulate other people's beliefs about ourselves for gain. We used an interpersonal bargaining game to probe the capacity of players to manage their partner's beliefs about them. This probe parsed the group of subjects into three behavioral types according to their revealed level of strategic deception; these types were also distinguished by neural data measured during the game. The most deceptive subjects emitted behavioral signals that mimicked a more benign behavioral type, and their brains showed differential activation in right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex and left Brodmann area 10 at the time of this deception. In addition, strategic types showed a significant correlation between activation in the right temporoparietal junction and expected payoff that was absent in the other groups. The neurobehavioral types identified by the game raise the possibility of identifying quantitative biomarkers for the capacity to manipulate and maintain a social image in another person's mind

Hepatitis-B- und -C-assoziierte Glomerulonephritiden

Zusammenfassung: Virale Hepatitiden sind häufig mit extrahepatischen Manifestationen assoziiert. Bei der HepatitisB ist die membranöse Glomerulonephritis (GN) die häufigste histologische Diagnose. Im Rahmen der HepatitisC wird vorwiegend eine membranoproliferative GN mit oder ohne gemischte Kryoglobulinämie beobachtet. Eine zentrale pathogenetische Rolle spielen Immunkomplexe (virale Antigene, antivirale Antikörper, bei Kryoglobulinämie auch Rheumafaktoren). Diese Komplexe werden in der Niere abgelagert und aktivieren Komplement, was schließlich zum Nierenschaden führt. Therapeutisch zentral ist die antivirale Therapie mit dem Ziel der Antigenelimination. Im Falle der HepatitisB kann eine Therapie mit IFNα durchgeführt werden, alternativ mit Lamivudin. Eine immunsuppressive Therapie steht eher im Hintergrund. Bei der HepatitisC ist die Standardtherapie IFNα in Kombination mit Ribavirin. Bei einer zusätzlichen Kryoglobulinämie besteht die Alternative einer Therapie mit Rituximab, bei schwerem Verlauf mit Plasmapherese, Steroiden und Cyclophosphamid. Bei vollständiger Elimination der Virusreplikation ist die Prognose dieser sekundären GN günsti

The resurrection of group selection as a theory of human cooperation

Two books edited by members of the MacArthur Norms and Preferences Network (an interdisciplinary group, mainly anthropologists and economists) are reviewed here. These books in large part reflect a renewed interest in group selection that has occurred among these researchers: they promote the theory that human cooperative behavior evolved via selective processes which favored biological and/or cultural group-level adaptations as opposed to individual-level adaptations. In support of this theory, an impressive collection of cross-cultural data are presented which suggest that participants in experimental economic games often do not behave as self-interested income maximizers; this lack of self-interest is regarded as evidence of group selection. In this review, problems with these data and with the theory are discussed. On the data side, it is argued that even if a behavior seems individually-maladaptive in a game context, there is no reason to believe that it would have been that way in ancestral contexts, since the environments of experimental games do not at all resemble those in which ancestral humans would have interacted cooperatively. And on the theory side, it is argued that it is premature to invoke group selection in order to explain human cooperation, because more parsimonious individual-level theories have not yet been exhausted. In summary, these books represent ambitious interdisciplinary contributions on an important topic, and they include unique and useful data; however, they do not make a convincing case that the evolution of human cooperation required group selection

Almahata Sitta Meteorite: Combination of Raman Spectroscopy and ElectronMicroprobe analysis within the ureilitic lithologies.

第2回極域科学シンポジウム/第34回南極隕石シンポジウム 11月17日（木） 国立国語研究所 2階講

On hotheads and dirty harries: The primacy of anger in altruistic punishment

Recent research has shown that individuals are prepared to incur costs to punish non-cooperators, even in one-shot interactions. However, why would people punish non-cooperators with no apparent benefits for the punishers themselves? This behavior is also known as altruistic punishment. When defection is discovered, an individual evaluates this act as unfair, which could result in anger. We argue that although unfairness and anger are often intertwined, it is primarily the experience of anger and not the perception of unfairness that produces altruistic punishment. We briefly present recent data in line with the hypothesis that identifies anger as the underlying mechanism of altruistic punishment. Furthermore, additional influences regarding the occurrence of altruistic punishment, e.g., intentionality of the interaction partner, the role of satisfaction, and individual differences, are discussed

Pay What You Want as a Marketing Strategy in Monopolistic and Competitive Markets

Pay What You Want (PWYW) can be an attractive marketing strategy to price discriminate between fair-minded and selfish customers, to fully penetrate a market without giving away the product for free, and to undercut competitors that use posted prices. We report on laboratory experiments that identify causal factors determining the willingness of buyers to pay voluntarily under PWYW. Furthermore, to see how competition affects the viability of PWYW, we implement markets in which a PWYW seller competes with a traditional seller. Finally, we endogenize the market structure and let sellers choose their pricing strategy. The experimental results show that outcome-based social preferences and strategic considerations to keep the seller in the market can explain why and how much buyers pay voluntarily to a PWYW seller. We find that PWYW can be viable in isolation, but it is less successful as a competitive strategy because it does not drive traditional posted-price sellers out of the market. Instead, the existence of a posted-price competitor reduces buyers’ payments and prevents the PWYW seller from fully penetrating the market. If given the choice, the majority of sellers opt for setting a posted price rather than a PWYW pricing. We discuss the implications of these results for the use of PWYW as a marketing strategy